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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE 
WESTERN MEN CONTRACT MAY BE TERMINATED 
WITHOUT CAUSE AND THAT THERE WAS SUF-
FICIENT CAUSE TO JUSTIFY TERMINATION OF 
THE WESTERN GIRL CONTRACT. 
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POINT II 
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND 
A BREACH OF CONTRACT ON THE PART OF WEST-
ERN MEN, INC. AND WESTERN GIRL, INC. AND IN 
FAILING TO GRANT DAMAGES TO THE PLAINTIFF 
FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT. 
POINT V 
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND 
THAT THE PLAINTIFF IS RELIEVED OF ANY FUR-
THER OBLIGATIONS TO THE DEFENDANTS BY 
REASON OF THE BREACH OF CONTRACT BY THE 
DEFENDANTS. 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action based on written contracts by which 
the Plaintiff seeks to have the Findings of Fact, Conclu-
sions of Law and Decree amended or set aside. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried without a jury before the Honor-
able Stewart M. Hanson, one of the judges of the Third 
Judicial District Court on the 6th and 7th days of March, 
1967. The Court entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law, and Decree. Said Decree awards some damages to 
Plaintiff. Plaintiff appeals the Decree as being insuf-
ficient. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks modification of Findings of Fact, Con-
clusions of Law, and Decree or seeks a new trial in the 
alternative. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Defendants Western Girl, Inc. and Western Men 
' Inc. are California corporations organized to provide 
temporary employees for clients in the temporary labor 
market. In Salt Lake City the Defendant Corporations 
operated on a franchise basis (R 113, 114). 
The Plaintiff, Afton S. Seegmiller, entered into a con-
tract with the Defendant Western Girl, Inc. on the 19th 
day of March, 1964 (R 24). She had been previously em-
ployed at $500.00 per month (R 260). She paid $250.00 
for the Western Girl franchise (R 264) (R 137). The 
Plaintiff operated its Western Girl franchise until the 
24th day of March, 1965 (R-29) at which time she ob-
tained a similar franchise contract with the Defendant, 
Western Men, Inc. The Plaintiff thereafter operated both 
franchises without incident until December 26, 1966 
when the Defendants unilaterally terminated the West-
ern Men, Inc. and Western Girl, Inc. contracts (R 236, 
142, 143). 
In March of 1965, an officer of Western Men, Inc. ap-
proached the Plaintiff and asked her if she would be in-
terested in having a franchise and in helping to admin-
ister a labor contract between the General Services Ad-
ministration of the United States Government at Clear-
field, Utah and Western Men, Inc. (R 205, P-1, P-2). It 
was because of the G.S.A. contract that the Plaintiff ob-
tained the Western Men franchise agreement. Subse-
quently, the G.S.A. contract expired and another was 
negotiated and expired and a third G.S.A. contract was 
entered into on October 1, 1966. The amount of profit 
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which accrued to the Plaintiff as a franchise under the 
first two G.S.A. contracts was nominal (R-214). How-
ever, because of the Viet Nam conflict, substantial work 
was being developed under the third G.S.A. contract (R 
217, 218, 219). Plaintiff stood in a position to earn a good 
profit after working and sacrificing for two years to build 
the business. On December 26, 1966, however, two offi-
cers of the companies came to Salt Lake City and de-
manded that the Plaintiff sign a release and give up her 
franchise operation. The Plaintiff refused and the officers 
of the Defendant Corporations attempted to serve her 
with a notice of termination of both franchise agreements 
(R 235, 236, 142, 143). The notices provided for termina-
tion within 60 days as the contracts provide, however, the 
officers of the Defendant corporations did replace the 
Plaintiff immediately and went to the G.S.A. offices to 
introduce a new employee of defendants and told G.S.A. 
that the Plaintiff, Mrs. Seegmiller would no longer be 
handling the G.S.A. accounts (R 236, 237). 
Based on the contract the Plaintiff filed the original 
Complaint herein, posted a bond and obtained a tempor-
ary injunction against the Defendant Corporations and 
their employee Edward Hoopes. On the 3rd day of Jan-
uary, 1967 (R 5, 9, 10), the Plaintiff further provided for 
an Order to Show Cause to be served on the Defendants 
to appear before the above court and show cause why 
the temporary Restraining Order should not be made 
permanent pending final hearing of the case (R 9, 10). 
The Order to Show Cause was heard on January 12, 
1967 and the Court rendered a decision which kept the 
Restraining Order in force on all aspects of both the 
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Western Men and Western Girl contracts except in mat-
ters concerning the G.S.A. contract. Since the G.S.A. con-
tract was the large bulk of the business, the decision ef-
fectively destroyed the Plaintiff's ability to operate. The 
Order of the Court was issued January 17 at which time 
the Plaintiff stopped operating the franchises (R 54, 55, 
56, 57). 
The Order of the Court in effect restrained the Plain-
tiff from operating under the contract and thus the Plain-
tiff who asked for relief and posted bond for temporary 
relief found herself restrained in all the profitable as-
pects of her contract by Defendants who had not asked 
for an Order of Relief nor had they posted bond as re-
quired by law (R 55, 56). During the time the Plaintiff 
operated the franchises, she expanded the business to a 
greater degree than the contracts required and produc-
tion was steadily increasing (R 135, 136, R 214). 
The Western Men Contract was negotiated exclusively 
to service the G.S.A. contract. (P 1, 2, 4, 5) and the Plain-
tiff was advised to service only G.S.A. if she so desired 
(P-5). The correspondence concerning the contract 
shows that the Plaintiff was to operate the Contract on 
the "Wasatch front", Salt Lake City, Ogden, and Clear-
field. (P-12. 4, 5) 
The Plaintiff at all times had an office and telephone 
contact and the Defendants did not at any time question 
the Plainitiff's office arrangements until after this law-
suit began. (R 129, 155, 156). The Defendants further 
stated that the reason for termination was the concern 
over the G.S.A. contract, but the notice strained to find 
other reasons of failure. (P 22, R 120, 121). 
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The cost to the Plaintiff in operating the Franchises to 
December 31, 1967 was as follows: 
WESTERN GIRL 
Six months of 1964 $727.70 per month = $4,366.20 
Three mo. of 1965 $554.02 per month = 1,662.06 
Nine months of 1965 $229.02 per month = 2,061.18 
Twelve mo. of 1966 $187.06 per month = 2,244,72 
Total expenditures on Western Girl: $10,334.16 
Paid: 250.00 
$10,584.16 
WESTERN MEN 
Nine months of 1965 $327.27 per month = $2,945.43 
Twelve mo. of 1966 $165.71 per month = 1,988.52 
TOTAL: 
TOTAL of Western Men and Western 
Girl Expenditures: 
(R 262, 263, 264) 
$4,933.95 
$15,518.11 
Mr. Stover one of the officers of the Defendant Cor-
porations stated that the Western Girl contract was 
worth $7,800.00 (R 289). 
The record is not clear as to what the profit to the 
franchisee would have been to the end of the current 
G.S.A. contracts because this would be speculation. How-
ever, it could now be determined as to the period of the 
G.S.A. contract has expired. 
The Western Men Contract, among other things, re-
cites as follows: 
• 
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" (a) In connection with the operation of a temporary 
placement service . . . the mailing of payroll checks, 
handling of all bookkeeping and all other details incident 
to a temporary payroll including preparation of neces-
sary payroll reports and returns. 
(b) Losses from uncollectable accounts ... by with-
holding from the amount due to you one percent of each 
period in that billing. The maximum in this account will 
be one percent of your highest consecutive thirteen pe-
riod billings . . . 
(1) We agree at our expense to have one of our 
trained representatives visit your office to assist you in 
the development and promotion of sales under this agen-
cy and to perform other such services as may be helpful 
to you. The schedule calls for one visit per year. 
( 4) ... In the event you find it necessary to termin-
ate this agency arrangement or where it is terminated in 
the event of your death, you or your legal heirs will have 
the option to sell the agency established by this agree-
ment to a person or persons who have received our ap-
proval ... 
( 5) . . . In the event we wish to terminate, we will 
likewise give you sixty days notice in writing ... " 
The Defendants, although complaining of the failure 
of the Plaintiff to service the contract were shown to be 
almost completely responsible for the failure of the pay-
roll (R 145, 150, 151, 152, 162, 163, 220, 221). Mr. Ed-
wards could only find one example of an error of the 
Plaintiff (R 164, 165). The Plaintiff, in an effort to cor-
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rect payroll problems, paid payroll from her own per-
sonal account (R 222). 
After the Court hearing on January 12, 1967, the De-
fendants in violation of their contract have held all addi-
tional payments due the Plaintiff under the excuse that 
the amount held was for bad debt reserve (R 250, 251, 
153, 154). The Plaintiff was given no opportunity to sell 
her franchise either in Western Men or Western Girl. 
Stover, one of the Defendant officers, stated that the 
franchise was worth $7 ,800.00 (R 153, 289). 
During the time that the Plaintiff held the franchise 
agreements with Western Men and Western Girl, she 
was never assisted or helped by the "home office" even 
though the home office was considering terminating the 
Plaintiff's franchise and was fearful over the G.S.A. con-
tract (Rl26, 127, 128). 
The Defendants did not follow the provisions of the 
Contract in effecting its termination. They attempted to 
obtain a signed Voluntary Termination Agreement and 
were unable to do so (P-31, R 236, 237). And unilaterally 
imposed an employee on the operation of the G.S.A. Con-
tract and had the unilateral termination sustained in 
Court. 
The Court, in its memorandum of decisions dated 
March 8 (R 83) in paragraph 2 recognizes that it had 
erred in its prior order (R57): 
"and the Court was therefore in error in not con· 
tinuing the injunction until the 60-day period was 
up." 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT 
THE WESTERN MEN CONTRACT MAY BE TERMIN-
ATED WITHOUT CAUSE AND THAT THERE WAS 
SUFFICIENT CAUSE TO JUSTIFY TERMINATION OF 
THE WESTERN GIRL CONTRACT. 
Williston 1017A states on contracts of employment con-
cerning the distributor-dealer franchise arrangement 
which is analoguous to the present case: 
"The elaborate instruments used to create these 
distributorships it should be remembered, are al-
most invariably drawn by or on behalf of the manu-
facturer and presented to the dealer or exclusive 
agent simply for his signature, not for further ne-
gotiation. The very fact that so frequently this care-
fully drawn instrument leaves the question of its 
termination, 'an obligation incompletely expressed' 
and the startingly disproportionate burden other-
wise cast upon the dealer should here, as in the re-
quirement and output contracts justify the Courts in 
inferring an intention to bind both parties for at 
least such time as may be required to demonstrate 
the cause or to establish grounds for honest dissat-
isfaction or otherwise for a reasonable time just as 
where no other promise is made. And further these 
contracts are made, if not upon an express promise, 
at least upon the understanding and expectation that 
the dealer will make a substantial investment in 
establishing or maintaining a business equipment or 
a service such as will successfully promote the sale 
of manufactured products within the territory ... 
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It is significant too, that reservations of a right of 
termination for designated cause have been held not 
to invalidate such exclusive contracts otherwise suf-
ficiently definate as to duration, on the ground that 
they do not confer a power at will but one heard on 
objective tests. And it has also been so held where 
the dissatisfaction of the manufacturer has been 
made the criterion for termination of the exclusive 
contract." 
ARD Dr. Pepper Bottling Co. vs. Dr. Pepper Co. (202 
F 2d 372) 
In an action between licensee and distributor soft drink 
company contract provided that if licensee within judg-
ment of Distributor "Fails to faithfully comply ... then 
upon written notice, the Distributor shall be entitled to 
cancel." The Court stated: "Courts are cautious in en-
forcing such contracts literally when to do so would re-
sult in injustice. Courts tend to adopt an interpretation of 
the contract wherever possible requiring performance to 
the satisfaction of a reasonable man. 
The same decision is reached in California Courts in 
Collins vs. Victor Manor Inc., (306 P2d 783, 47 Calif. 2d 
875). 
In Watkins vs. Rich, 254 Mich 82, 235 NW 845, the Courts 
took the position that a contract terminable upon written 
notice could not be terminated except for cause. (See 
also: Moon Motor Car of New York, V Moon Motor Car 
Co. (29 f2d3 cca2). 
In Erskine vs. Chevrolet Motor Company (185 N.C. 479, 
117 SE 706). In distributor dealer contract, the sales 
-
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agency held entitled to recover expenses and profits upon 
cancellation of contract by automobile company. 
In Terre Haute Brewing Company vs. Dugan (102 F2d 
425 (CCA8): 
The Court noted that in Missouri, the general rule is 
subject to the limitation that "if it appears that the agent, 
induced by his appointment has incurred expense in the 
matter of agency without having had sufficient opportun-
ity to recoup from the undertaking, the principal will be 
required to compensate him in that amount." 
Good faith on the part of the Distributor in all cases 
seems to be one of the criterion for deciding whether or 
not the termination of a contract will be enforced. 
A careful review of the record would raise some 
serious doubts as to the good faith of the defendant Cor-
porations. Consider: 
(a) no warning or notice was given to Plaintiff that 
her contract was in jeopardy; 
(b) conversations by officers of Defendant Corpora-
tions with Defendant Hoopes; 
( c) difference between the testimony as to reason for 
termination of notice and that stated in the notice itself 
gives rise to the question, were the defendants searching 
for an excuse to terminate the contracts? 
( d) failure of Defendants to send anyone to help with 
contracts; 
( e) complete ignorance of the Defendants as to office 
locations prior to time of trial; 
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(f) Inability to show failure of plaintiff to properlv 
handle payroll and with one brief exception to obtain all 
employees needs for the GSA contract. 
It is submitted that the procedure of the Defendant 
corporations in the alleged termination of the contracts 
was not in good faith and the Court should find that in 
the absence of cause shown, a notice of termination is not 
in good faith and is not sufficient to cancel the contract. 
This case is, in many aspects, analagous to the line of 
cases decided by the Utah State Supreme Court in the 
area of forfeiture of equities under a uniform real estate 
contract. 
Under Spencer vs. Perkins (121Utah468 243 P2d 466), 
the Court set out just what rights a forfeiting vendor 
might have on a repossession. These were outlined as 
follows: 
"Vendors are entitled to any loss occasioned to them 
by any of these factors: (1) less of an advantageous 
bargain; (2) damage to or depreciation of the prop-
erty; (3) any decline in market value of the property 
and ( 4) for the fair rental value of the property 
during the period of occupancy." 
It is obvious that there was no lack of bargain. Mr. 
Stover (defendant officer) stated that Western Girl 
Franchise was worth $7 ,800.00. There was also no loss 
through depreciation, no loss of market value, and the 
percentage payment received on employment secured 
during the operation of the contract would adequately 
pay reasonable rental value. Under this doctrine the 
the plaintiffs would be entitled to the increased value of 
the franchise operation. 
-
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POINT II 
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND 
BREACH OF CONTRACT ON THE PART OF WEST-
ERN MEN AND WESTERN GIRL AND IN FAILING 
TO GRANT DAMAGES TO THE PLAINTIFF FOR 
BREACH OF CONTRACT. 
Williston, 1967, Ed, Sec 1017, p. 169. 
As has been said, several courts have held that even 
where there is a direct reservation of a right to termin-
ate, otherwise than at will, any violation of the terms of 
the agreement before it is terminated in the specific way 
provided for is actionable. 
Atlas Brewing Company vs. Hoffman (217 Iowa 1217, 
252 NW 133). 
"In the trial of the agent's counterclaim for a breach 
of oral contract giving the agent exclusive sales 
agency, evidence of exact quantity of principals 
products sold in agents territory by successor agency 
and of sales of subagencies established by counter-
claimant and of costs and expenses and value of 
time expended in selling product, and of what net 
profits and commissions would have been was prop-
erly admitted." 
Smith vs. Mendonsa (238 P.2d 1039 108 CA 2d 540) 
"It is the duty of courts to encourage keeping of 
agreements properly made and to give adequate 
remedy for breach thereof when it occurs, particu-
larly where breach is deliberate and wrong and is 
willful.'' 
Young vs. Borden Broadcasting Co. (255 P2d 888, 75 Ariz 
298). 
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"Where the contract has been breached by one party, 
the other party to the contract, having fully per-
formed his part of the contract up to date of breach 
may sue either on contract or quantum merit." ' 
In the instant case, the Defendants were so anxious to 
terminate the contract that they actually went to the 
G.S.A. point of operation and imposed their own em-
ployee. They did not honor the contract which provides 
for a 60 day notice. Notwithstanding the existence or non-
existence of cause for termination, the contract was 
breached by the Defendants by premature intervention. 
The defendants even secured the assistance of the Court 
in sustaining their position and entering an Order re-
straining the Plaintiff from performing her contract. 
Said Order was entered on January 12, 1967 (R-57). 
POINT III 
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND 
THAT THE PLAINTIFF IS RELIEVED OF ANY FUR· 
THER OBLIGATIONS TO THE DEFENDANTS BY 
REASON OF BREACH OF CONTRACT BY THE DE· 
FEND ANTS. 
It is fundamental law that if the Promisor is himself 
the cause of failure of performance, either of the obliga-
tion to him or of conditions upon which his own liability 
depends, he cannot take advantage of failure and there· 
fore any further performance is excused when perform· 
ance has been prevented. 
Cladianos vs. Friedhoff, (240 P2 208, 69 NEV. 41). 
Big Boy Drilling Corporation, Ltd vs. Etheridge, et al. 
-
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(111P2d953, 44 CA2d 114). 
Also see Utah case of Swanner vs. Union Mortgage 
Company (105 P2d 342, 99 UT 298). 
This is the fact situation in the case at hand. The De-
fendants breached the contract in two ways: 
(1) By imposing a termination outside the contrac-
tual provisions, and 
(2) By terminating the Contracts by notice, but with-
out cause. 
The Plaintiff should, therefore, be affirmatively re-
lieved of any further performance under the contracts. 
CONCLUSION 
The Plaintiff seeks to have the Decree of the lower 
Court modified to find as follows: 
TO FIND 
1. No right in Defendants to terminate Western Men 
and Western Girl contracts without cause; 
2. That no cause existed for such termination; 
3. That the Defendants did terminate the Western 
Men and Western Girl Contracts and that such termina-
tion constituted a breach of contract; 
4. That the Plaintiff is entitled to damages equal to 
herr costs of development of the franchises, namely: 
$10,584.16 for Western Girl Contract, and 
$ 4,933.95 for Western Men Contract, or 
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that the case be remanded to the Court for determination 
of the amount of profit which could have been realized 
on the operation of the Contracts over a reasonable pe-
riod of time by the Plaintiff and that a reasonable period 
of time be not less than the months of operation left in 
the G.S.A. contract. 
5. That the Plaintiff has no further duty to the De-
fendants under the Western Men and Western Girl Con-
tracts. 
Respectfully submitted, 
LORIN N. PACE 
WATKINS, PACE & WATKINS 
336 South Third East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
